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The Case of the Smart City
Bruce Peabody* & Kyle Morgan**

A BSTRACT
January 7, 2021, marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of Marsh v.
Alabama, the case in which the Supreme Court of the United States
extended the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to a
privately held “company town.” This article makes the case that the
longstanding Marsh precedent, and the basic jurisprudential framework it
set out, remain important in working through twenty-first century
problems regarding public-private partnerships and their impact on
constitutional rights. We bring this old ruling into our new century by
extrapolating a hypothetical legal controversy from legislation currently
under consideration in the states. Thus, the heart of our analysis involves
an imagined case (and the resulting, imagined judicial opinions) arising
from a potential bill that has not yet become law. This speculative
approach is an effective way to think through, in advance, stubborn and
emergent questions about the constitutional nature and limits of private
actions that emulate government functions.
January 7, 2021, marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of Marsh v.
Alabama.1 In its 1946 opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled that Grace Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness, was protected under the U.S.
Constitution in distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of
Chickasaw, Alabama. At the time, Chickasaw was a “company town”—
that is, a territory or municipality “dominated by one large business” that
had assumed many of the functions and operations traditionally provided
by state, county, or local governments.2
* Professor of Government and Politics, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison, New
Jersey; B.A., 1991, Wesleyan University; Ph.D., 2000, University of Texas at Austin. The authors
thank the editorial team of the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law; Abagail Belcastro
and Madelyn Ferrans for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this piece; and M.T.
Anderson, Max Barry, and John E. Finn for inspiration.
** Assistant Professor of Political Science, Francis Marion University; B.A. 2011 Fairleigh
Dickinson University; Ph.D. 2020 Rutgers University.
1. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
2. Shaun Richman, Company Towns Are Still with Us, THE AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://prospect.org/economy/company-towns-still-us/. The Marsh Court did not provide a definition
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This article makes the case that the longstanding Marsh precedent, and
the basic jurisprudential framework it set out, remain important in working
through twenty-first century problems regarding how we think about
public-private partnerships and their impact on constitutional rights. Our
take on these issues is somewhat novel. We do not survey existing
scholarly paradigms, engage in a detailed exegesis of recent and
representative cases, or advance a singular new theory to grapple with the
problems at Marsh’s center. Instead, we bring this old ruling into our new
century by extrapolating a hypothetical legal controversy from legislation
currently under consideration in the Nevada legislature.3 Thus the heart of
our analysis involves an imagined case (and the resulting, imagined
judicial opinions) arising from a potential bill that has not yet become law
(as of the writing of this article).
We believe this speculative approach is an effective way to think
through, in advance, stubborn and emergent questions about the
constitutional nature and limits of private actions that emulate government
functions. Among other benefits, our orientation balances the theoretical
and the particular. We avoid getting ensnared in the details (and associated
politics) of any single legislative proposal, while still offering a level of
specificity regarding (again, largely invented) facts and legal issues,
allowing us to fashion plausible judicial opinions.

I. B ACKGROUND
Among other implications, Marsh sketched some of the outer limits of
the U.S. Constitution’s state action doctrine, the legal principle that most
constitutional protections curb only government actors, institutions, and
policies. While the Court conceded that Chickasaw was a privately held,
“company-owned town”4 and that Marsh’s actions were “contrary to the
wishes of the town’s management,”5 she was nevertheless permitted to
share her ideas and writings because the town did “not function differently
from”6 traditionally governed municipalities. As the Court elaborated, the
of a “company town” (or even use that specific phrase). Hardy Green argues that company towns tend
to fall into two models: those focused on profits and those based on a more “utopian” vision of “ideal
communities.” HARDY GREEN, THE COMPANY TOWN: THE INDUSTRIAL EDENS AND SATANIC MILLS
THAT SHAPED THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 4–5 (2010).
3. See Nevada Bill Would Allow Tech Companies to Create Governments, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Feb. 4, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/legislature-legislation-local-governments-nevadaeconomy-2fa79128a7bf41073c1e9102e8a0e5f0.
4. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 508.
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“managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press
and religion of . . . people consistently with the purposes of the
Constitutional guarantees.”7 In extending constitutional protections to a
private entity, the Court seemed to embrace functional analysis over more
formalistic line-drawing.8
While the state action doctrine has received a great deal of judicial and
scholarly attention,9 historical developments (including the near
disappearance of company towns resembling the one featured in Marsh)
and the Court’s subsequent case law arguably cast the case’s ongoing
significance into some doubt.10 As the Court itself noted in Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner,11 in extending constitutional safeguards to a private entity, Marsh
may represent an unusual exception to the supposedly bright lines of the
state action doctrine insofar as the company in Chickasaw “was
performing the full spectrum of municipal powers[,] and stood in the shoes
of the State.”12 In more recent cases the Court has held that private venues
(such as shopping malls) that open their doors for general public use and
congregation do not necessarily fill the “shoes” of the state and thereby
assume obligations to protect constitutional civil liberties.13
7. Id.
8. See John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 569, 583 (2005); cf. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (affirming an essential
distinction between public and private acts).
9. See generally Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers
v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1330 (1982) (criticizing the state action doctrine as inconsistent);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985) (calling for the end of the
state action doctrine); Julian N. Eule as completed by Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First
Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1537 (1998) (examining the public-private divide in the context of free speech); Cass R. Sunstein,
Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 263–300 (1992) (analyzing the state action doctrine and
free speech).
10. See THE COMPANY TOWN: ARCHITECTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE
3–14 (John S. Garner ed., 1992) (“Most company towns appeared between 1830 and 1930 during the
early industrial age . . . .” Id. at 3.); Kristine Bowman, Marsh v. Alabama (1946), MIDDLE TENN. ST.
UNIV.: THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYC. https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/571/marsh-valabama (last visited Sep. 19, 2021) (“The ‘company town’ is largely a thing of the past . . . .”).
11. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
12. Id. at 569.
13. The Court’s approach to the issue of whether free speech extends to private entities has
been somewhat serpentine. In Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Loc. 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968), the Court appeared to extend Marsh in ruling in favor of peaceful union picketing in
front of a nonunion grocery store within a private shopping mall. But just four years later the Court
backed away from Logan Valley in finding that private malls were not comparable to Marsh’s
municipal sidewalks. In Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the Court
officially overruled Logan Valley while affirming Marsh. Finally, in PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Court unanimously affirmed a state court decision that allowed
protests at a private shopping center against the constitutional objections of the owner.
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But trends in the U.S. and internationally suggest that the core legal
issues in the Marsh decision remain apposite. As Hardy Green argues,
“company towns are not simply a phenomenon of the past: In an age of
transnational corporations and exurban sprawl, [they] remain a basic part
of American life” spanning locales from Corning, New York to Google’s
Project 02 complex in Oregon and Amazon’s HQ2 near Washington,
D.C.14 Moreover, nations across the globe are experimenting with granting
businesses and private organizations greater autonomy and responsibility
in both SEZs (special economic zones) and so-called private “smart”
cities.15
Indeed, less than two weeks after Marsh’s anniversary, Nevada
Governor Steve Sisolak outlined plans to foster “Innovation Zones” in his
State of the State address.16 Sisolak’s proposal, and the related draft
legislation under consideration, would seek to attract “[n]ew companies
creating groundbreaking technologies” without the leverage of tax breaks
or direct government investment.17 Instead, the law would permit private
organizations meeting certain criteria (including sufficient land ownership
and a promised level of financial investment in a specific geographic zone)
to play the predominant role in creating and directing a Board of
Supervisors. This Board would then assume control over governing,
regulatory, and personnel decisions traditionally managed by county
governments. This authority would cover such matters as being able to
levy taxes, run school districts, and hire and direct county-level agents,
including but not limited to “the county clerk, recorder, sheriff, treasurer,
assessor, auditor, public administrator, and the district attorney.”18

14. GREEN, supra note 2, at 4.
15. See Political Priority, Economic Gamble, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4–10, 2015, at 67. While
beyond the scope of this article to investigate, we note, in passing, that today’s blurring of boundaries
between public and private may not be entirely surprising given the extraordinary influence of some
corporations in setting the terms of policy debates. See also Allan Smith, ‘Impressive and a Little
Scary’: How Amazon and Jeff Bezos Made Washington a Second Home, NBC NEWS.COM (Sept. 6,
2019, 5:46 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/king-hill-how-amazon-jeff-bezosmade-washington-second-home-n1033296; Richman, supra note 2 (“In the 21st century, company
towns . . . still wield extraordinary power.”).
16. Full Transcript, Annotations of Sisolak’s 2021 State of the State Address, NEV. INDEP. (Jan.
20, 2021), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/full-transcript-annotations-of-sisolaks-2021state-of-the-state-address.
17. Id.
18. Bill Draft Authorizing the Creation of Innovation Zones, SCRIBD (Jan. 31, 2021),
https://www.scribd.com/document/493267147/Innovation-Zone-Bill-Draft-update-1-31-2021. Much
of the statutory language in our hypothetical case is directly borrowed from or closely based on this
“Bill Draft.”
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The rest of this article uses this context as an entryway to an imagined
set of facts and a resulting, hypothetical court case that raise enduring and
nascent legal issues about the reach and purposes of our courts and
Constitution. While loosely based on the particulars of the proposed
Nevada law, the dispute we consider takes place in the invented GENifer
Therapeutics Innovation Zone (GTIZ), which is itself part of an
unidentified state in the United States (which we simply identify as the
“Commonwealth”).
These conceits allow us to transcend any single policy, era, or set of
governing laws, bypassing the granularity of specific statutory
interpretation and application in favor of more general philosophical and
jurisprudential considerations.19 Moreover, we do not delineate the
identity of the court rendering judgment in our hypothetical, and we avoid
delving too deeply into the particulars of existing precedents and case law,
in part out of a recognition that the law is always evolving. Instead,
continuing a tradition that stretches back to Lon Fuller,20 our “Case of the
Smart City” is “intended neither as a work of satire nor as a prediction in
any ordinary sense of the term.”21 The six opinions (and judges) we present
are invented, although they are based on common ideas in American
constitutional law and broadly accepted modalities of constitutional
argument.22 Our speculative exercise explores “divergent philosophies of
law and government”23 and trenchant problems in public affairs more than
offering a specific set of legal arguments likely to appear in an actual
courtroom or judicial decision.
What follows, then, without additional commentary, are the six
separate opinions rendered in our hypothetical case. The opinion is issued
seriatim, with no majority decision or opinion of the court.
19. Our approach is also consistent with the “utopian” tradition in political, social, and
economic thought. As the scholars Gregory Claeys and Lyman T. Sargent note, “Utopianism generally
is the imaginative projection, positive or negative, of a society that is substantially different from the
one in which the author lives. The word utopia or outopia was derived from Greek and means ‘no (or
not) place’ . . . .” THE UTOPIA READER 1 (Gregory Claeys & Lyman T. Sargent eds., 1999).
20. In 1949, legal philosopher and professor of law Lon Fuller published “The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers.” While based on an actual case from the 19th century, Fuller’s hypothetical
explores how five different (invented) judges employ different theories of law to resolve a case
involving five trapped cave explorers who resort to cannibalism to survive. Lon L. Fuller, The Case
of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). See also LON FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 245–253 (1969) (setting out the imagined “Case of the Grudge Informer,” which is based on
how post-war German courts resolved certain cases involving the rule of law under the Nazi regime).
21. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, supra note 20, at 645.
22. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1984) (discussing the “modalities” of constitutional interpretation).
23. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, supra note 20, at 645.
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D URN V. B OARD OF S UPERVISORS
BARRY, J.
We are presented with the question of whether the Constitution’s First
Amendment protections of speech and religious expression apply through
the Fourteenth Amendment to a territory that is both owned and effectively
governed by a private organization.
Several years ago, the Commonwealth passed legislation, CRS 4300,
allowing for the creation of Innovation Zones. Under the terms of the
statute, private businesses are eligible to form their own Zones after
meeting certain criteria and having their applications approved by the
state. Among other restrictions, Innovation Zone applicants are required
to own at least 50,000 contiguous acres (78.125 square miles) of
undeveloped land that was not already part of an existing “city, town, tax
increment area, or redevelopment area.” Furthermore, the law stipulates
that the area enclosed by the Zone could not encompass preexisting
permanent residents.
Appellee, the biotechnology firm GENifer Therapeutics, submitted a
successful Innovation Zone application and was then permitted, under the
terms of CRS 4300, to appoint two of the three members of a governing
Board of Supervisors; the third member was appointed by the Governor of
the Commonwealth.
Once constituted, the Board immediately acquired a set of powers
under CRS 4300, Section 14. Specifically, this authorizing provision
stipulates that:
Following final state approval, the Innovation Zone becomes akin to a
local government and a political subdivision of the Commonwealth with
the powers and duties of a county separate from and independent of the
county in which it is located. The Innovation Zone Board of Supervisors
then possesses the powers and duties of a Board of County
Commissioners, the exercise of which supersede similar powers held by
the county government in which the Innovation Zone is located. Nothing
in this act shall be construed to otherwise modify or delimit existing legal
powers of any other governing entity in the Commonwealth, including,
but not limited to the Governor and the General Assembly.

Pursuant to this Section 14 authority, the GENifer Therapeutics Innovation
Zone (GTIZ) Board of Supervisors convened and passed a series of
measures, including Ordinance 2081, which specifies, in part, that:
This Zone is a privately held entity focused on developing cutting edge
biotechnology research and resulting products and services to benefit our
customers, shareholders, and the broader public. Individuals who are not
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employees of GENifer Therapeutics or its authorized subsidiaries,
contractors, or service providers must receive written permission before
visiting the GENifer Therapeutics Innovation Zone. Anyone discovered
within the Zone without this permission is subject to removal and a fine
not to exceed $5,000.

Appellant Violet Durn is a member of the Baháʼí Faith and a resident of
the Commonwealth. In early May she entered the Central Campus of GTIZ
by foot, circumventing the three established entry points (accessible by
private roads owned by GENifer Therapeutics). Over the next few hours,
Durn distributed religiously oriented leaflets to over two dozen GENifer
employees she encountered on the moving walkways that connect the
Central Campus parking lots, recharging stations, technology hubs, office
parks, and other work and residential centers.
Eventually, a GENifer marketing executive, John Nike, requested that
Durn provide written evidence that she was permitted on the premises.
When no such permission was presented, Nike phoned GTIZ security and
waited with Durn until several deputies arrived. These agents forcibly
removed Durn from the Innovation Zone and provided her with written
notice that she 1) had violated Ordinance 2081; 2) was liable for a fine of
up to $5,000; and 3) had the option to contest the violation before the GTIZ
constituted Justice Court, a body authorized by the Board under the terms
of CRS 4300.
Appellant Durn declined to appear for her appointed Justice Court date
and was issued a $1,000 fine, with the warning that a subsequent offense
would trigger a maximum penalty and, potentially, other sanctions
consistent with GTIZ Ordinances.
She then brought a petition of error before this court, alleging that her
treatment and sentence violated her constitutional rights to free speech and
religious freedom. She asks that the judgment of and fine issued by the
Justice Court be vacated, and that GENifer Therapeutics and its governing
and administrative bodies be enjoined from “additional actions which
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of anyone inside the
GTIZ.”
Appellee counters that the GTIZ, as a privately held enclosure of
lands, people, and property, is not a government entity and is, therefore,
beyond the reach of the free speech and religious liberty protections of the
U.S. Constitution.24 In this view, Ms. Durn possesses no more claim to

24. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free
speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.”).
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share her beliefs on the grounds of the GTIZ than she could in an
unwelcoming stranger’s home.
The matter before us bears more than a passing resemblance to the
Supreme Court case of Marsh v. Alabama.25 Marsh’s central holding is
that a privately held town, exhibiting features and providing services like
an ordinary municipality, is bound by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. To prevail, therefore, the GTIZ Board of Supervisors must
show that the law established in Marsh does not readily apply to the facts
and issues in the current controversy.26
Marsh v. Alabama involved the “company town” of Chickasaw,
Alabama, where the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned the local
residences, stores, and infrastructure.27 Marsh stood on the town’s
(privately owned) sidewalk “and undertook to distribute religious
literature”28 notwithstanding a company warning that “This Is Private
Property, and Without Written Permission, No Street, or House Vendor,
Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted.”29 After being asked
to leave (and refusing), she was arrested by a deputy sheriff (paid by the
Gulf Corporation) and charged with violating a state law barring criminal
trespass.
The Court found that since Chickasaw was open “for use by the public
in general”30 and did not operate differently from traditional
municipalities, it was bound by the Constitution’s First and Fourteenth
Amendments as much as any government unit would be.31 Consequently,
Marsh’s arrest violated her rights to freedom of speech, press, and religion.
The facts in Marsh, and the legal principles it affirmed, directly relate
to today’s case. As one scholarly commentator summarized: even though
a nominally private actor, “the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation[] was

25. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
26. Alternatively, appellee could have argued that Marsh’s holding should be reexamined
because its rules have, over time, proven unworkable, unfair, or otherwise unjustified. See generally
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (setting out some of the
principles used to determine when the Court “reexamines a prior holding”).
27. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502.
28. Id. at 503.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 506.
31. In a somewhat cursory analysis, the Court argued that since “the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment” absorbed the protections of the First Amendment, Grace Marsh’s distribution
of “religious writings” was protected from the criminal sanctions imposed by the state of Alabama. Id.
at 511. But on the wider question of “state action” Marsh does not give clear indicia of when a private
company town is effectively a federal government unit and when we should regard it as a state entity.
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deemed a state actor because it acted like a government by managing a
whole town with streets open to the general public.”32
In the instant case, the privately held firm GENifer Therapeutics,
acting on its own and through a Board of Supervisors it appointed,
similarly manages an entire town—and over 12,000 residents. The
corporation acquired territory amounting to almost one hundred square
miles, roughly the footprint of the city of Boston, Massachusetts. The
properties GENifer Therapeutics owns within the GTIZ include
restaurants, shopping centers, a school, recreation buildings, parks,
recycling facilities, a theater for artistic performances, a power plant, and
a well and processing plant for clean water production and sewage
treatment. In addition, under the terms of CRS 4300, the Board of
Supervisors has assumed all “the powers and duties of a Board of County
Commissioners,” including the ability to impose taxes and fees on those
living in the Zone, license Zone businesses, and hire and fire designated
public employees such as a county clerk and treasurer.
The GTIZ has even created its own justice system to which Ms. Durn
has been subjected. This comprehensive law enforcement network (with
its unnerving, hybrid public-private character) includes a Zone Sheriff, a
dozen deputies answering to the Sherriff, a district attorney, and a Justice
Court for handling disputes within the territory.
We should recall that in the original Marsh case the services offered
by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation were comparatively modest. The
company town of Chickasaw consisted of “residential buildings, streets, a
system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a ‘business block’ on which
business places are situated.”33 The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation also
paid a single Mobile County Sheriff to “serve[] as the town’s
policeman.”34
In contrast, the GENifer Innovation Zone offers a much more
elaborate and comprehensive set of services and institutions to those living
under its supervision. Furthermore, its oversight of these operations,
principally through its Board of Supervisors, is formal, comprehensive,
and direct. Thus, the GTIZ Board imposes specific regulations and
guidelines for a wide range of behaviors and activities, encompassing such
matters as traffic and transportation, minor criminal infractions, proper
environmental practices and waste disposal, new building construction,

32. Fee, supra note 8.
33. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502.
34. Id.
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and taxes on certain products and services deemed to be “non-productive
and/or inefficient.”35
It is something of a truism to note that “all politics is local,” but the
scope of the GTIZ Board’s local authority is a striking embodiment of this
thesis. By any measure and definition, the GTIZ Board serves as the most
important (and often the sole) provider of both vital services and
obligatory rules for the thousands of long-term residents who live within
the Zone. In short, under the Marsh test, the GTIZ is undoubtedly the
equivalent of both a company town and a municipality—indeed, one with
an especially wide range of authority and power.
But does it follow from this that the GTIZ and its Board of Supervisors
owe any constitutional duties to appellant Durn as a visitor to the Zone?
The essence of the state action doctrine is that the Fourteenth
Amendment exists to “provide modes of redress against the operation of
State laws, and the action of State officers, executive or judicial, when
these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the
amendment.”36 Thus, once we have identified the Board of Supervisors as
occupying the same legal position as “State officers,” the principal
remaining questions are whether such actors are required under the
Fourteenth Amendment to uphold the protections of the First Amendment,
and whether appellant Durn’s actions fall under those protections.
At the time Marsh was issued, it was already clear that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended the protections of free
exercise of religion,37 freedom of speech,38 and freedom of the press,39 to
the states and state actors as well as the federal government. In holding
that a company town was comparable to a state municipality, the Court
logically extended this principle to cover “the dissemination of ideas on
the [Chickasaw] city streets.”40
Following the same rationale, once one agrees that the GTIZ Board of
Supervisors is legally cognizable as a state entity, its constitutional
responsibilities are coextensive with any other municipality. The Board
must therefore uphold all elements of the Bill of Rights incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment, including the First Amendment.
35. GTIZ Ordinance 2003.
36. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
37. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
38. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (extending the free speech and freedom of press
protections of the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
39. Id.; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
40. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504 (1946).
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Turning to the question of whether Ms. Durn’s specific activities were
covered under this constitutional aegis, one might note that her claimed
interest in sharing her beliefs and faith with Commonwealth citizens is
coterminous with the Constitution’s “fundamental personal rights and
liberties” which include freedom of speech, press, and religion.41 As the
Court has elaborated:
The phrase [fundamental personal rights and liberties] is not an empty
one and [is] not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the
Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free
government by free men. It stresses, as do many opinions of this court,
the importance of preventing the restriction of enjoyment of these
liberties.42

Violet Durn sought nothing more than to share her ideas peaceably with
fellow citizens of the Commonwealth. In particular, she hoped to transmit
the message of “achieving world peace through unity, justice, and equality
amongst people of different faiths and races.” Ms. Durn communicated her
views respectfully and quietly by distributing leaflets to individuals using
the central pedestrian walkway in the GTIZ. Her activities thus fit clearly
within the core of what Marsh called our rights “to enjoy freedom of press
and religion”—a class of liberties that occupy a “preferred position”
relative to other interests. Appellant’s asserted rights are therefore nested
within a particularly sturdy constitutional keep.
My brother Friedman comes to a different judgment in this case, in
part because he prioritizes the states’ role as “active laboratories” of
democracy—experimenting with different social and economic policies
including those that creatively delegate authority from government
officials to private parties. Such arrangements, he contends, do not
compromise liberty so long as the participating citizens can either leave
states (and Innovation Zones) they don’t like or change state policy
through elections. But such an emphasis prioritizes property rights and
economic interests over the rights of conscience and expression that courts
have long recognized hold a “preferred position” in our constitutional
scheme.
Core to the judicial power is a responsibility to identify a floor of
liberty that government may not breach.43 The residents in the GTIZ
41. Schneider v. New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
42. Id.
43. It is beyond the current case to consider the conditions under which citizens may explicitly
waive First Amendment rights in government or private contexts. See generally Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (setting out the waiver requirements in the context of the Fifth
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continue to enjoy the constitutional rights of any other citizen populating
the Commonwealth; they do not lose their power to worship, to speak, to
assemble, and to debate simply because they work within a statutorily
created Zone designed to boost the economic conditions of the sponsoring
state.
To hold otherwise would create a two-track democracy in which
citizens operating within the protective sphere of traditional governments
could claim the full sweep of civil liberties, while those laboring within
powerful private entities that accrue public functions could find their
freedoms stripped away. The GTIZ is not some Land of Oz where the laws
constraining power are warped and Commonwealth citizens shuffle off
their rights.44
In her State of the State address, Commonwealth Governor Mae
Holland hailed the creation of Innovation Zones as “alternative forms of
local government” that would bring in an “invigorating torrent” of tax
revenue and jobs to the state. But whatever economic benefits these Zones
may provide, and whatever their policy merits (or liabilities), they are
unmistakably local governments, as the Governor’s remarks concede. As
such, the Commonwealth’s Zones owe responsibilities to the citizens they
govern and the wider political communities in which they take root.
Recognizing the protections of the Bill of Rights is the start of these
responsibilities, although certainly not their end. GENifer Therapeutics
has chosen to act like a government and now it must contribute its part to
the social contract.
The judicial power can be difficult to exercise. Some decisions present
conflicts between competing or incompatible legal values, what Justice
Felix Frankfurter characterized “as a tragic issue, namely, the clash of
rights, not the clash of wrongs.”45 Other times, we must render judgments
that can appear to run counter to common sense or desirable public policy.

Amendment right to assistance of counsel); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1983) (upholding
the power of the Central Intelligence Agency to make an employee sign an agreement that prohibited
him from publishing any information relating to his employment without prior approval); Richard A.
Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4,
7 (1988). No party in this case argues that appellant Durn waived her rights on entering the GTIZ.
44. Of course, some Commonwealth citizens who assume positions within GENifer
Therapeutics or official duties within the GTIZ may be limited with respect to when they can exercise
their First Amendment rights. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (finding that speech by
public officials is only protected if conducted in a private capacity, not if engaged in as part of the
official’s formal duties). But Ms. Durn is clearly not a Commonwealth or GTIZ official.
45. Quoted in James E. Fleming, Constitutional Tragedy in Dying: Or Whose Tragedy Is It,
Anyway?, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 162, 163 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).

62

51

The Case of the Smart City

Sometimes deciding cases is onerous because the law itself is unclear or
conflicted.46
But the case before us is not difficult along these or any other
dimensions. We are asked to apply a longstanding and still viable
precedent that pertains clearly to a novel set of facts. If we ignore this clean
fit between established law and new circumstance, and break from widely
accepted judicial principles, we threaten to undermine the “steady, upright,
and impartial administration of the laws”47 that is the hallmark of an
independent and effective judiciary.
I would find for the appellant and enjoin the GENifer Therapeutics
Innovation Zone’s Justice Courts and other agents from implementing
Ordinance 2081 in its current form.
FRIEDMAN, J.
At first glance, as my brother Barry indicates, this case seems to entail
a relatively straightforward, perhaps even a facile application of the legal
principles laid down in Marsh v. Alabama. Marsh held that a “companyowned town”48 sufficiently resembled a “municipal . . . corporation”49
such that the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments applied
to it, notwithstanding the venerable judicial rule (and original
understanding) that the Constitution generally only binds governments and
their representatives, not private parties.50
But a closer review of both the facts at hand, and the particulars of the
Marsh precedent, lead me to a different conclusion.
In its Marsh analysis, the Supreme Court emphasized three factors that
led it to conclude the private property of the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation should be subject to the strictures of the Constitution.51
First, the Court noted the close resemblance of the town of Chickasaw
to “any other American town”52 governed by traditional municipal
officials and institutions. Chickasaw, for example, maintained streets for

46. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (Justice Kennedy noting that
sometimes the courts “must make decisions we do not like”).
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
48. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
49. Id. at 504.
50. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
[Fourteenth] amendment.”); Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that
YouTube is not a state actor required to abide by constitutional restrictions regarding free speech).
51. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503–510.
52. Id. at 502.
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public use, “a sewage disposal plant,”53 and hired a sheriff deputy to serve
as the town’s law enforcement officer. There were no idiosyncratic signs
or other identifying features in place to make visitors believe they were in
a privately-held space distinct from other towns. In other words,
Chickasaw resembled a government in its services and operations.
Second, the Marsh opinion found that the geographic and logistical
accessibility of “the town and its shopping district”54 made it more like a
public entity than a private one. The “company-owned paved street and
sidewalk”55 and its “business block”56 of stores were reachable via a “fourlane public highway.”57 The public had unobstructed entry to the company
town and could take full advantage of its facilities, businesses, and
infrastructure. In other words, Chickasaw resembled a government in its
public and open character.
The third factor the Court emphasized in its decision was the public’s
concern with “the functioning of the community in such manner that the
channels of communication remain free.”58 Here Marsh turned not just on
the resemblance of Chickasaw to an ordinary municipality in its public
services and general accessibility, but in identifying a critical national
interest in its activities. More specifically, the Court determined that the
wider political order had a legitimate stake in ensuring that the residents
of Chickasaw had opportunities to share ideas, debate, and express
themselves individually and in groups such that they could capably “make
decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation.”59 In the
Court’s judgment, this interest was sufficiently important that it both
helped to mark the public character of Chickasaw and trumped the
“property rights”60 possessed by Gulf Shipbuilding (preempting its power
to exclude unwanted visitors). As Justice Hugo Black summarized in the
majority opinion: “Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or
possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the
functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of
communication remain free.”61

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
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Taken together, these three factors seem like sensible ones for
identifying the rare cases in which a private organization should be
regarded as effectively assuming “the full spectrum of municipal
powers,”62 presumably because existing governments have proven
ineffective or incapable.63 But applying each of these considerations to the
case at hand exposes a yawning gap between the circumstances in Marsh
and the dispute we adjudicate today.
To begin with, in considering the resemblance factor, no one entering
the GENifer Therapeutics Innovation Zone would mistake it for “any other
American town.” Under GTIZ Ordinance 1884, every GENifer employee
and visitor is required to wear a prescribed uniform or “suitable
professional attire along with an identifying lanyard ID” outside of their
personal domicile and other designated areas (such as spaces for recreation
and fitness or points for delivering goods). Furthermore, every building in
the Zone is marked by the distinctive GENifer logo and painted in the
company’s tasteful teal and crimson colors.
Overall, the GTIZ complex is designed to function as a “smart city,”
fueled by market forces, industry best practices, and new technological
discoveries—to maximize efficiency and utility for workers and company
alike. Thus, the GTIZ implements evidence-based policies regarding food
and energy distribution, communications, transportation, and
sustainability and waste management that mark it as distinct from ordinary
urban centers. Indeed, in appellant’s own affidavit, she noted that “[w]hen
I first entered the Zone I couldn’t believe my eyes. Everything was so
beautiful and . . . orderly. There wasn’t a blade of grass out of place. It was
like nothing else I’d ever seen.”
Clearly the GTIZ is in a different category than the “company town”
of Marsh, which was, concededly, indistinguishable from ordinary towns
governed by ordinary public officials.
Moreover, in considering the second Marsh factor, the degree to which
a private corporation makes itself accessible and open (in a manner
resembling traditional public spaces), the GTIZ operates very differently
than did Chickasaw, Alabama. As stipulated in GTIZ Ordinance 1138,
access to the Zone is limited to one of three entry points, each of which is
62. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).
63. In its broad strokes and minute details, the U.S. Constitution imagines and relies upon a
partnership between state and federal governments and private actors. See generally SAMUEL H. BEER,
TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 386 (1993) (“[The aim of]
American constitutionalism . . . is not to put a brake on popular government but to make it work.”).
Courts should be wary of setting out legal precedents that stifle innovative power-sharing and
rendering decisions that cut short still unfolding policy innovations.
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staffed twenty-four hours a day by a uniformed GENifer employee who
regulates traffic and ensures that entrants have proper authorization under
Ordinance 2081.
Moreover, the GTIZ was developed out of a previously uninhabited
geographic area and, as a result, it is a forty-five-minute drive to the
nearest conventional town outside of the Zone.64 No one stumbles into the
GTIZ by accident. Indeed, the trial record shows that appellant took
elaborate steps (abandoning her vehicle in the synthetic woodlands
surrounding the GTIZ and hiking more than a mile past the designated
entry points) in order to gain (illegal) access.
As the Court noted in Marsh, the “more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it.”65 The inverse of this proposition is also true: private
property owners can lessen their legal responsibilities by restricting
access.66 In fact, the considered actions of the GTIZ’s Board of
Supervisors show that it took reasonable steps to limit public entry and
demarcate the Zone as private territory not available to the uninvited. The
fact that Ms. Durn forced her way into the privately held Zone, violating
the terms of both the Commonwealth’s public law creating Innovation
Zones (CRS 4300) and the access Ordinance (2081) issued by the Board
under this authority, does not make her entitled to exercise rights any more
than an exuberant proselytizer might insist on a personal audience in a
private home.67
The third and final element in the Marsh analysis may seem the most
compelling in considering the case at hand. Don’t the American people as
a whole have a vested interest in creating an active, informed, and dynamic
citizenry, and shouldn’t this imperative incline us to extend First

64. Hackenstown is 53 miles from the nearest GTIZ entry point.
65. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.
66. The judicial test for whether an area or building is constitutionally protected “curtilage”
under the Fourth Amendment is but one example of this proposition. See United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294 (1987) (noting that the degree to which a private property owner has taken steps to conceal
an area from public view is one of the elements for determining curtilage).
67. The fact that Ordinance 2081 authorizes visitors to the GENifer Innovation Zone (and the
observation that school groups, business solicitors, and curious tourists have taken advantage of this
policy) does not extinguish the privacy and property interests of GENifer Therapeutics. Private
property does not “lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for
designated purposes.” Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 569.
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Amendment rights to private as well as public organizations to ensure that
our “channels of communication remain free”?68
But identifying and applying this interest requires further
specification. The judiciary’s general approach has been to recognize that
private actors assume distinctive public responsibilities (and are therefore
subject to constitutional limitations) when they perform a “public
function.”69 But such a function must be “traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State.”70 While the GTIZ provides organized dispute
resolution through its Justice Courts, public safety protection via its Zone
Sherriff, and energy and infrastructure to its thousands of residents, none
of these services can be regarded as “an activity that only governmental
entities have traditionally performed.”71 After all, every day, millions of
Americans rely on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), seek protection
from private security companies, and consume utilities furnished by
nongovernmental corporations.
But even if one finds the public function argument inapplicable, we
might consider a second, broader claim in ascertaining whether the public
has an actionable interest in extending free speech and expression rights
to the GTIZ. As my sister Truepenny seems to indicate, perhaps our
national interest in free speech and expression (and all the public goods
that come with it) is so compelling that courts can superimpose First
Amendment protections whenever private entities sufficiently impact (and
perhaps threaten) robust “channels of communication.”
While presumably well-intentioned, this speech-impact approach is
both inconsistent with existing case law72 and faces inevitable problems of
measurement and line drawing. Once we have thrown out the publicprivate distinction, how are we to determine which entities have sufficient
sway on our political discourse and civic character to receive First
Amendment protection? Is a privately held corner café that attracts a
68. See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), for Justice Holmes’s
arguments about how free political communication is essential not just for individual “self-expression”
but for wider “self-government.” That said, we should note that courts are generally reluctant to
compromise the rights of individuals for broader social purposes and benefits. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (rejecting an argument that Amish children can be compelled to go to
public school because the state has an interest in preparing citizens to “participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system”).
69. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
70. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)); see also Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 2002).
71. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019).
72. See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the argument
that the popularity and extensive usage of YouTube makes the private organization subject to the First
Amendment).
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politically passionate clientele more or less deserving of constitutional free
speech than the Department of Motor Vehicles? How about a
multinational biotechnology corporation committed to product innovation
and securing returns to its investors? Is such an organization obligated to
offer venues for free speech and religious expression (and where and how
many?), even if it judges them to be distracting or even inimical to its
central mission?
Another danger of extending Marsh’s “public interest”73 argument is
that it offers only one, and a rather narrow, vision of a vibrant citizenry.
While the employees of and visitors to the GENifer Therapeutics
Innovation Zone are somewhat restricted in their movements and activities
within the Zone, they are free to leave (both physically and virtually) when
not at work. In our age of online communication, citizens have an almost
endless variety of resources and forums for acquiring information and
countless opportunities and platforms for sharing their ideas (so long as
this shared communication does not violate any terms of employment, of
course). Moreover, concerned employees of GENifer Therapeutics, and
any other Commonwealth citizen, can petition lawmakers to revise the
terms of CRS 4300, altering or even reigning in the powers of the Board
of Supervisors and, perhaps, extending rights similar to those found in the
First Amendment.
Finally, every employee and every concerned citizen has the ultimate
freedom of choice: they can start their own business, find employment
with a different company, or take up residence in a different state with a
purportedly more friendly policy towards free speech and religious
expression in private settings.
In all of this, we should not lose sight of Justice Louis Brandeis’s
reminder that a “state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”74 The presence of such active laboratories is a sign of political
health, not oppression, and they enhance the people’s freedom so long as
Americans can vote with their feet and ballots regarding the experiments
they favor. The Commonwealth’s creation of the GTIZ clearly falls within
such a tradition, and the state’s Innovation Zones should be allowed to
develop further (without interference from courts) until the people
abandon or alter them through the democratic policy process or their own
private choices.

73. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 517 (1946).
74. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
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Every free state worthy of the name requires a robust and freewheeling
marketplace of ideas, opinions, and beliefs. But the environments for such
debate and sharing of beliefs must be formed voluntarily by individual
citizens, or provided to all by the government itself. Sharing one’s speech
and faith are the priorities of some but not all of the constituents of a free
people. We do not advance the cause of liberty or republicanism by
dictating a single vision of acceptable communication in the workplace, or
by dogmatically insisting that individuals prioritize freedom of speech and
religious exercise over other (and perhaps preferred) interests such as
economic well-being or forming communities dedicated to self-expression
through work.
For the reasons outlined above, I would rule in favor of the GTIZ
Board of Supervisors and sustain both appellant’s sanction and the
Ordinance upon which it is based.
HANDY, J.
I am persuaded by my brother Justice Barry’s analysis that the
“longstanding precedent” of Marsh “pertains clearly” to the new facts at
hand. If the GENifer Therapeutics Innovation Zone and its hand-picked
Board of Supervisors is not the functional equivalent of a “companyowned town” then Marsh has lost all meaning and must be formally
abandoned. However, with the possible exception of my sister Justice
Truepenny, none of the opinions on this court signal a readiness to take
this dramatic step.
That said, concluding that the GTIZ amounts to a state actor only
addresses part of the constitutional puzzle before us. Even traditional state
actors and institutions are not required to extend the guarantees of the First
Amendment (and other civil liberties) indiscriminately across all
government settings.
The courts have developed a so-called “public forum” doctrine to
delineate three categories of public spaces in which First Amendment
rights apply to differing degrees: traditional, nonpublic, and designated
forums.75 While the case law defining these categories and applying their
associated rules is somewhat muddled, one can fairly conclude that the
“extent of the first amendment protection varies with the character of the
property to which speakers seek access.”76
75. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
76. Peter Jakab, Public Forum Analysis After Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educator’s Association—A Conceptual Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly
Owned Property, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545 (1986).
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In traditional public forums, “places which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of
the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”77 In such
settings “a principal purpose . . . is the free exchange of ideas.”78
Therefore, government regulations of speech in these contexts must satisfy
“strict judicial scrutiny”; that is, the restrictions must be “narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest” or they will be found
unconstitutional.79
Nonpublic forums involve government “property which is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication.”80 Here the
state “may reserve the forum for its intended purposes . . . as long as the
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Thus,
applying this approach, Greer v. Spock upheld a regulation at the Fort Dix
Army Base prohibiting “[t]he distribution or posting of any publication . . .
without prior written approval.”81
The third category, designated or limited forums, are, in essence,
nonpublic forums that the government has chosen to open for public
communication and speech (such as auditoriums, theaters, and meeting
sites).82 The government does not need to create such forums, but once it
decides to dedicate a public space to an expressive purpose or function, it
must grant First Amendment rights to those using it.
If one assumes that the GTIZ and its Board are effectively acting in a
government capacity, how should we apply the foregoing forum analysis?
Appellant Durn distributed her writings on the heavily used Zone
walkways that resemble the sidewalks and streets that are at the very heart
of the Court’s conception of traditional public forums. As Justice Owen
Roberts noted, “Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”83
One might well conclude, then, that appellant’s First Amendment
claims are at something of an apex since she occupied a physical space

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
Cornelius v. NAACP Leg. Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
Jakab, supra note 76, at 549.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 831 (1976).
Jakab, supra note 76, at 549.
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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that seems synonymous with Hague’s “streets and parks” and the
“sidewalks” at issue in Marsh.
But a closer look reveals that the “walkways” in the GTIZ actually
assume a variety of carefully designated forms, and these distinctions
should give us pause as we consider whether they fill the same role as the
sidewalks and streets found in “any other American town.” For example,
the particular walkways appellant occupied are marked by the GTIZ Board
with green stripes and clearly identified as “Commerce Paths”—the most
efficient and direct routes between important points of business. These
moving walkways are distinct from the static “Freight and Transport
Paths” (marked in red) and “Recreation Paths” (blue) set aside for “leisure,
sport, and gatherings.” Furthermore, the GTIZ provides a number of parks,
food courts, social hubs, and other designated areas for small group and
larger gatherings. In any event, the motile, solar-powered, ergonomic
Commerce Paths resemble Marsh-style, traditional sidewalks little more
than an airport runway resembles a country lane.
So how does the established jurisprudence assist us in judging whether
Durn’s presence on the GTIZ’s Commerce Paths placed her in a
traditional, designated, or nonpublic forum—and then in determining what
rights she retained in this context, and whether the government (Board)
claims against her could overcome these liberty interests?
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the Court set out the
criteria it employs in identifying the nature of a government space and how
much access it must grant with respect to speech forums.84 Generally,
Cornelius tells us, “the extent to which the Government can control access
depends on the nature of the relevant forum.”85 In determining whether
government property should be recognized as a public forum, the Supreme
Court has “looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain
whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly
and debate as a public forum . . . . [and] the nature of the property and its
compatibility with expressive activity to discern the government’s
intent.”86
Furthermore, in those instances “where the principal function of the
property would be disrupted by expressive activity, the Court is
particularly reluctant to hold that the government intended to designate a
public forum.”87 Finally, the Court has “recognized that the location of
84.
85.
86.
87.

Cornelius v. NAACP Leg. Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
Id. at 800.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 804.
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property also has bearing because separation from acknowledged public
areas may serve to indicate that the separated property is a special enclave,
subject to greater restriction.”88
If we stipulate that the GTIZ Board of Supervisors, at least in effect,
occupies the shoes of the government in this case, we can also concede
that they have taken some reasonable efforts to distinguish access to
different spaces within the Zone. The Commerce Paths appellant occupied
have a limited, functional purpose (to assist employees in expediently
getting to work sites, other employees, and authorized Zone visitors), and
are plainly designated by signs, symbols, and usage. At the same time, the
GTIZ provides acknowledged public areas, including the recreational
RejuvLands parks, buildings set aside for social gatherings, and the
designated blue Recreation Paths.
Thus, the Board has attempted to restrict and demarcate how the
Commerce Paths are used, and limit assembly and debate to other
locations it deems more compatible with expressive activity. These actions
are not only consistent with the guidelines set out in Cornelius and related
cases, but they serve valuable interests. As the trial court record shows,
among the individuals Ms. Durn detained (in her attempt to educate
GENifer employees about her faith) was an on-duty Emergency Medical
Technician on her way to a patient in distress. While the record stipulates
that no harm befell the patient as a result of Ms. Durn’s actions, these
circumstances suggest that using the green Commerce Paths may not be
an ideal choice for expressive purposes, particularly since so many
superior alternatives are available. Stated bluntly, appellant’s expressive
activity undoubtedly “disrupted” the “principal function” of the
Commerce Paths.89
In short, even granting that appellant has First Amendment rights in
the GTIZ, she did not exercise them in a permissible constitutional forum.
This judgment may strike some as too fine-tuned—a technicality that
threatens the spirit of our commitments to free speech and religious
exercise. But it is a judgment consistent with an established law that
balances individual liberties and government responsibilities. Appellant’s
possible ignorance about the availability of alternate spaces for exercising
her rights is no defense, particularly since the GTIZ Ordinances are
compiled and made public.
For these reasons, I would rule in favor of appellant Durn on the
question of whether the GTIZ and its Board is subject to the First
88. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992).
89. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804.
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Amendment, but find in favor of appellee insofar as its actions are
consistent with a reasonable policy of directing speech and expression to
suitable public and designated forums.
ANDERSON, J.
My brother Handy resolves this matter by turning to a full-blown
forum analysis. Some future case may well occasion this inquiry, but it is
unnecessary today.
Whatever else it may be, the GENifer Therapeutics Innovation Zone
is a functioning town with sidewalks, streets, parks, and public gathering
spaces, notwithstanding any market-tested and obfuscating corporate
labels. These spaces are subject to First Amendment protections that
cannot be abridged by those who govern the town, viz., the GTIZ Board
and its agents.
The Board’s Ordinance 2081 is written in such blanket terms
(applying to anyone not contractually affiliated with GENifer
Therapeutics) that it limits free speech across the entire Zone to those who
can obtain “written permission” in advance. Such a restriction runs afoul
of established case law and enduring constitutional principles.
In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, the Court ruled
that a Jersey City ordinance barring “public assembly in the streets or
parks of the city without a permit from the Director of Safety” effectively
“abridged or denied” the rights of the people “to use the streets and parks
for communication of [their] views.”90
Subsequently, in Marsh, the Court affirmed that
neither a State nor a municipality can completely bar the distribution of
literature containing religious or political ideas on its streets, sidewalks
and public places or make the right to distribute dependent on a flat
license tax or permit to be issued by an official who could deny it at
will.91

Ordinance 2081 clearly violates the rule set out in Hague, Marsh, and
numerous other cases: broad permit restrictions on speech and assembly
are presumptively unreasonable and invalid.
For this reason, I would rule in favor of appellant Durn on the question
of whether the GTIZ and its Board is subject to the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and strike down Ordinance 2081 as unconstitutional on its

90. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 498 (1939).
91. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504 (1946).

73

BYU Journal of Public Law

[Vol. 36

face. The measure crimps the free speech and religious exercise liberties
of any nonauthorized visitor in its powerful and clumsy grasp.92
KALDEN, J.
I agree with my colleague Justice Friedman, that the analogy between
Marsh and the present case is strained at best. The GENifer Innovation
Zone does not obviously resemble the 1940s company town of Chickasaw,
or, indeed, any other conventionally governed municipality. The GTIZ’s
distinctive aesthetic, design, operations, and raison d’etre are unusual if
not unique.
Consider in this regard that a resident in the GTIZ stays in the Zone
for an average of only thirty-eight months before transferring to another
city or work site. In contrast, in the nearest traditional municipality,
Hackenstown, most inhabitants reside for life. The GTIZ is an
environment in which science and product innovation, productivity, and
boosting profits serve as the centripetal forces that bring employees
together (but only for a time). Hackenstown’s citizens, in comparison,
remain in and contribute to their community for any number of reasons
including pride of place, civic and family ties, and a love of heritage,
however they define it. The residents of the GTIZ have a more transitory
and transactional relationship with the Board of Supervisors, undercutting
the claim that it serves as their de facto government.
Beyond these points, the contention that the GTIZ resembles a
traditional municipality is belied by another observation: its powers are
merely granted and contingent. If the GTIZ and its Board exercised actual
political authority, they could claim an irreducible “monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”93 But the GTIZ
Board possesses no true and indissoluble monopoly over any government
function or operation. Indeed the GTIZ exists and persists solely because
of the authority and support of the Commonwealth legislature, governor,
and electorate. Even after its creation, the Board remains dependent on
these fonts of power; its existence can be revoked at the whim of the
92. The specific analysis in my opinion makes it unnecessary to consider whether the
regulation in question, GTIZ Ordinance 2081, is so broad in its scope that it raises issues, on its face
and in application, about the judicial doctrines of due process, overbreadth, and vagueness. See United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (finding a prohibition on depictions of animal cruelty to be
unconstitutionally overbroad); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (finding a city
ordinance violated constitutional standards of due process due to its vagueness); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (requiring state employees to renounce
Communism was unconstitutional in its overbreadth and vagueness).
93. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright
Mills eds., 1958) (italics removed).
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General Assembly. Traditional municipalities, in contrast, can point to a
founding, a history, and a popular legitimacy independent from an act of
legislative willpower.
But while I find myself unmoved by the argument that the GTIZ is
indistinguishable from the company town in Marsh (and conventional
governing bodies), the Commonwealth’s hand-in-glove relationship with
the Zone may still create state action that allows appellant to prevail.
As the Supreme Court has concluded in other contexts, state action
may be implicated by the cooperation or passivity of the state in
superintending (or permitting) the actions of private parties or entities.94
To cite just one example, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority held
that a racially discriminatory private restaurant (the Eagle Coffee Shoppe)
leasing space from a state authorized agency (the Wilmington Parking
Authority) was subject to the protections of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.95 The City of Wilmington created the
Authority through legislation and then tacitly supported its commercial
partnership with the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, thereby “insinuat[ing] itself
into a position of interdependence” and making the state a “joint
participant” in the discriminatory activity.96 As the Court summarized,
“By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made
itself a party to the refusal of service [to Black customers], but has elected
to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted
discrimination.”97 The state’s entanglement with the Eagle Coffee Shoppe
extended the Fourteenth Amendment’s legal roots to an admittedly private
organization not otherwise subject to the state action doctrine.
Indeed, a close reading of Marsh reveals a similar relationship in play.
Justice Black’s majority opinion concluded by noting that the private
property claims of the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation were overcome by
the state’s involvement in “permitting a corporation to govern a
community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties” and the
state’s attempt “to impose criminal punishment” on Marsh through the
Alabama justice system.98 “[A] state statute . . . which enforces such
action by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute religious
94. See generally Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (“Although the
conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution’s scope in most instances, governmental
authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with
the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional constraints.” Id. at 620.).
95. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
96. Id. at 725.
97. Id.
98. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
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literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.”99
Moving to the present case, we might note that the Commonwealth
has always had an intimate legal relationship with the GTIZ. The
Commonwealth General Assembly and Governor Holland authorized the
creation of Innovation Zones through legislation and then approved the
specific GENifer Therapeutics Zone application. Today the
Commonwealth receives millions of dollars in tax revenues from the GTIZ
and accepts criminal cases coming out of the Zone that exceed the
jurisdiction of its Justice Courts. But for the deliberate acts and continued
support of government, the GTIZ would neither exist nor persist.
At the same time, the scope of the Commonwealth’s delegation of
authority under CRS 4300, Section 14 is comprehensive, extending to all
“the powers and duties of a Board of County Commissioners, [but] the
exercise of which supersede similar powers held by the county
government in which the Innovation Zone is located.” Thus,
notwithstanding the statutory basis for the Zone, the law’s sweeping
cession of power to the GTIZ’s governing Board might plausibly distance
subsequent corporate activities from the initial governmental
authorization, creating a kind of legal circuit breaker to state action claims.
The courts have been reticent “to fashion and apply a precise formula”
for recognizing when the state’s responsibilities under the Fourteenth
Amendment work their way into private parties benefitting from state
action, inaction, enforcement, or complicity.100 It is a genuine challenge
“to define the boundary between public and private spheres in a world of
overlapping interests and roles.”101 Especially where private entities
“perform public functions with government-sanctioned authority, it is not
easy to identify where the government domain ends and the private domain
begins for purposes of constitutional law.”102
Thus, the question of whether the Commonwealth has placed
sufficient “power, property and prestige behind” the GTIZ’s alleged
violation of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights is one that requires
thorough and careful review. Since this specific issue was not vetted by
the courts below, I would remand this case for briefing and reargument,
and any further proceedings to be had as may be just under the
circumstances.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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TRUEPENNY, J.
I find myself on a deeply divided court. I count two votes (Justices
Barry and Anderson) for appellant Durn and two votes (Justices Friedman
and Handy) for appellee, the GTIZ Board of Supervisors. Justice Kalden
occupies still another position in declining to offer a judgment beyond
ordering the court below to hear argument on the question of whether the
Commonwealth’s ongoing “entanglement” with the GTIZ is sufficient to
extend constitutional responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Board of Supervisors. Across the court’s various opinions, I can
identify few points of convergence in applying doctrine or judging the
merits.
But while my learned and able colleagues engage the issues at hand
with different emphases and readings of law, they appear quietly unified
on one important point: the liberty interests in the Constitution’s First and
Fourteenth Amendments should be construed in a crabbed manner,
recognizing these rights only in the context of government authority. In
the prevailing view, a conscientious jurist attempting to apply the
Constitution’s Bill of Rights cannot disentangle civil liberties from the
state’s claims to rule. Debates about “state action,” and how far it extends
to private entities, are still conversations that place individual freedom in
a zero-sum struggle with official power to, for example, regulate religious
expression or communication about matters of faith.
I come to this case with another perspective. It is high time that the
words of the First Amendment be construed not as contingent limits on
government action but as broad and affirmative grants to the people. We
should follow the example of one of my brother Friedman’s vaunted
laboratories of democracy, starting with the assumption that every person
“may freely speak, write and share his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of this right.”103 Such an approach places
a presumption on public liberty and a prejudice against its encroachment
or diminution.
In contrast, our current First Amendment jurisprudence typically
begins by identifying valid exercises of government power and then
balancing this authority against constructed, elaborate, and somewhat
defensive accounts of why free speech and religious expression are good
for political communities. In this conception, rights can only gather in the
gaps or interstices of the state’s authority, however it is defined.

103. CAL. CONST. art 1, sec. 2.
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Instead, we must place We the People and their liberties in the driver’s
seat, requiring governments, elected officials, and private organizations to
explain why any impingements on fundamental rights of individual
expression are essential to good governance and healthful political
communities.
This shift may strike some as subtle, but it has important and even
transformative implications. In addition to putting liberty (and the people)
first and power (and government) second, this democratic and affirmative
understanding of the First Amendment elides the distinction between
public and private restrictions on expressive freedom, a division that is
often difficult to sustain (as the different judgments of my brothers and
sisters on this court make clear). A citizen journalist hoping to write about
municipal corruption on an online forum—and the public that consumes
her work—does not care if the story is killed by a local official’s
instructions or the private host’s willful editorial decision (or automatic
selection algorithm).104 But under our existing law, constitutionally
protected free speech only finds a foothold where the
“government . . . intentionally open[s] the property for public
discourse.”105 Again, such an orientation makes the state’s decisions the
driver of our freedom, rather than the other way around.
Whatever its failings and limitations, the proverbial marketplace of
ideas needs a lively and accessible space for banter, barter, exchange, and
riposte. But in this century this venue is more likely to assume the form of
electronic discussions hosted by private businesses rather than quaint brick
and mortar squares in the center of town.106 Regardless of ownership and
irrespective of their particular physical or digital contours, these spaces do
not grant or facilitate the rights of a free people like rented rooms; instead,
they follow and accompany these rights—like footprints or shadows.

104. See Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 633, 655–59 (1991) (arguing that the public-private distinction is irrelevant in determining
whether a space possesses the characteristics of a traditional public forum).
105. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added).
106. My proposed jurisprudential shift is certainly at odds with some existing First Amendment
decisions. See, e.g., Prager, 951 F.3d 991 (“a private entity hosting speech on the Internet is not a state
actor.” Id. at 997.); Howard v. America Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2000); Manhattan Cmty.
Access Corp. v. Halleck 139 S.Ct. 1921 (2019) (“[M]erely hosting speech by others is not a traditional,
exclusive public function and does not alone transform private entities into state actors subject to First
Amendment constraints.” Id. at 1930.). But it is consistent with another line of cases recognizing that
liberty interests regularly affect and even trump claims regarding private property and economic
development. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (reviewing
the argument that “in order to assure that the institution of private property serves the end of individual
freedom and liberty it has been restricted in many instances.” Id. at 285.).
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My brother Friedman’s meticulous, eloquent, and ultimately wrongheaded opinion encourages the members of this court to consider how
different readings of constitutional law give rise to different visions of an
engaged and “vibrant citizenry.” I applaud this exercise. But he sketches a
portrait of an atomistic public, furtively acquiring information and ideas
necessary to build a healthy democracy in whatever territory remains after
government powers and private market forces have filled their claims.
I would instead start with the touchstone of the People’s rights and the
ingredients necessary for our individual autonomy and collective civic
health.107 One of these ingredients is surely our innate right to selfexpression with regards to politics, religion, and conscience—a right that
can only be infringed upon with the narrowest and most convincing
rationale. A model of affirmative and popular liberty is the true basis for
an empowered electorate and a democracy populated with fully realized
human beings.
In addition to erasing the public-private divide respecting restrictions
on free expression, an affirmative reorientation of the First Amendment
invites us to consider liberty not just in its philosophically “negative” sense
(the absence of constraints or barriers) but in its “positive” and communal
dimensions. This shift recognizes the inextinguishable
wish on the part of the individual to be his own master . . . to be a subject,
not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are
my own . . . above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active
being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by
references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I
believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize
that it is not.108

Such an empowering, “self-directed,” and almost psychological understanding
of the First Amendment encourages courts, elected officials, and citizens
alike to reflect and act upon their respective and complementary roles in
nurturing, preserving, and responsibly exercising liberty. For example, the
judiciary might use this new framework to rethink the ways in which “hate
speech” or unconstrained corporate spending can threaten or dilute the
citizenry’s collective capacities to be willfully choosing subjects, rather
than emphasizing any single individual’s prerogatives and privileges.
Legislatures, on the other hand, may rightfully feel the weight of an
107. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87
(1980) (arguing for “a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review”).
108. ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 178 (Henry Hardy
ed., 2002).
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obligation to provide online access to all citizens under this conception.
And for the people, affirmative liberty means understanding that our
personal freedom of speech and worship necessarily includes a reciprocal
responsibility to protect the same freedoms for our fellow citizens—and
not an unconstrained license to attack them.
“Civil liberties” are a special class of freedoms—those that exist
because of our participation in a civil order of organized politics and the
rule of law. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights is not just “an
impenetrable bulwark”109 against government to be erected and
maintained by independent courts; it is also “a book in which people can
read the fundamental principles of their political being.”110
With these considerations in mind, I would reverse the opinion of the
lower court and ask that the current case be remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

109. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (James Madison arguing that with
the inclusion of a bill of rights in the Constitution, “independent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive. . . .” Id. at 457.).
110. Herbert Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION
SECURE RIGHTS? 15, 30-31 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1985).
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